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Abstract. In computer science, various logical languages are defined to
analyze properties of systems. One way to pinpoint the essential differ-
ences between those logics is to compare their expressivity in terms of
distinguishing power and expressive power. In this paper, we study those
two concepts by regarding the latter notion as the former lifted to classes
of models. We show some general results on lifting an invariance relation
on models to one on classes of models, such that when the former corre-
sponds to the distinguishing power of a logic, the latter corresponds to its
expressive power, given certain compactness requirements. In particular,
we introduce the notion of class bisimulation to capture the expressive
power of modal logics. We demonstrate the application of our results by
revisiting modal definability with our new insights.
1 Introduction
Logical languages are formal languages that can be used to express properties of
mathematical structures: models. The standard notion for comparing how much
logical languages can say about a certain class of models, are distinguishing
power (can a language tell the difference between two models?), expressive power
(which classes of models can be defined by a formula of the language?).
The well-known hierarchy is as follows: distinguishing power is a coarser
criterion for comparing languages than expressive power, e.g. if two languages are
equally distinguishing, they are not necessarily equally expressive, but if they are
equally expressive, they are equally distinguishing. We can relate the two notions
by observing that expressive power can be seen in terms of distinguishing power
lifted to classes of models: a class of models is definable in a logic iff the logic
can distinguish that class and its complement.
An important concept closely related to the distinguishing power in this
context is structural equivalence on models, e.g. isomorphism and bisimulation.
Classic results showed that certain logics can only distinguish models up to
certain structural equivalences, thus giving upper bounds of the distinguishing
power of the logics. In that case, the structural equivalence is an invariance
relation for such logic. Under some restrictions, a structural equivalence may
capture the distinguishing power of the logic precisely, such that two models can
be distinguished by the logic iff they are equivalent according to the structural
equivalence.
⋆ The authors are supported by NWO project VEMPS 612.000.528.
One goal of the paper is to sharpen the understanding of the difference be-
tween expressive and distinguishing power. We observe that expressive power
can be seen as distinguishing power generalized to classes of models. This gives
rise to the question whether a corresponding notion of invariance exists. In search
of such notion, we generalize structural equivalence on models to structural re-
lations on classes of models, and use that for a notion of class invariance for a
logic that gives information about its expressive power.
In Section 2 we study the expressive power as generalized distinguishing
power in detail. We give some general invariance results in Section 3 on lifting
structural equivalence on models to a relation on classes of models. We show
that the two natural notions of class invariance correspond precisely to the class-
equivalence and class-indistinguishability relations respectively, when restricted
to compact classes. This result is closely related to the use of compactness in
existing Lindstro¨m-type characterization theorems. In Section 4 we study class-
bisimulation in the light of existing results on bisimulation.
We characterize modal definability by our notion of class-bisimilarity.
Related work. Comparing expressive power of different logics has always been a
central issue in the study of logics. In the context of computer science, the work
on comparing LTL and CTL is a notable example (a.o. [7, 3, 5, 10]), besides fun-
damental characterization theorems that capture the expressive power of modal
logic and modal mu-calculus [12, 9]. More recent results in terms of Lindstro¨m-
type characterization theorems also helped us sharpen our understanding on
various fragments of FOL which are useful in computer science [13, 4, 11]. More
comprehensive discussions on the expressivity of modal logics can be found in [8].
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we study the gap between distinguishing power and expressive
power. When comparing two logics L1 and L2, we assume a given class of models
M on which L1 and L2 are interpreted; we use ‘classes of models’ usually for
‘subclasses of M’. All logics in this paper are assumed to be 2-valued.
2.1 Expressive Power as a Generalized Distinguishing Power
As we mentioned in the introduction, the distinguishing power of a logic is its
power to tell two models apart. We call a formula ϕ in a language L a separating
formula for models M1 and M2 (M1 ‖ϕ M2), if either M1  ϕ and M2 6 ϕ, or
vice versa. We write M1 ‖L M2 if there exists ϕ ∈ L with M1 ‖ϕ M2.
We say L2 is at least as distinguishing as L1 (L1 4d L2) iff
∀M1,M2 ∈ M :M1 ‖L1 M2 implies M1 ‖L2 M2.
For expressive power, we say L2 is at least as expressive (in defining properties
i.e. classes of models) as logic L1 on M (L14eL2) iff
∀ϕ1 ∈ L1∃ϕ2 ∈ L2∀M ∈ M :M  ϕ1 iff M  ϕ2,
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It is not hard to prove that L1 4e L2 implies L1 4d L2, but the converse
may fail, as the following table, comparing several modal logics, shows.
expr
 L1 ✶e L2 L1 ≺e L2 L1 ≈e L2
dist
L1 : PDL
L1 ✶d L2 L2 : ML
− ⊥ ⊥
M : all Kripke models
L1 : LTL L1 : ML
L1 ≺d L2 L2 : CTL L2 : ML∞ ⊥
M : all Kripke models M : all Kripke models
L1 : PDL L1 : ML
L1 ≈d L2 L2 : ML
− L2 : ML∞ any L1 = L2
M : image-finite modelsM : image-finite models on any M
Fig. 1. Some modal logics compared with respect to expressive and distinguishing
power. The symbols ≺d,≈d and ✶d stand for strictly less distinguishing, equally dis-
tinguishing and incomparable in distinguishing power respectively; ≺e,≈e and ✶e are
the respective counterparts for expressive power. In the table, ML is basic modal logic;
ML− is basic modal logic with a backward modality; ML∞ is basic modal logic with
infinite (arbitrarily large) conjunctions; PDL is propositional dynamic logic; LTL is
Linear time temporal logic and CTL is computation tree logic. Image-finite Kripke
models are those in which from each world only finitely many worlds are accessible.
All results are standard or easy to see; for LTL vs CTL cf. [7].
We now have a closer look at the notions of expressive and distinguishing
power. The key observation is to view expressive power as distinguishing power
on classes of models, with standard distinguishing power the special case for the
restriction to singleton classes.
Like in the case for distinguishing power, we call a formula ϕ in a language
a separating formula for classes of models C1, C2 ⊆M (C1 ‖ϕ C2), if either
C1 ⊆ {M ∈M |M  ϕ} and C2 ⊆ {M ∈M |M 6 ϕ} or vice versa.
We write C1 ‖L C2 if there exists ϕ ∈ L with C1 ‖ϕ C2. Note that {M1} ‖ϕ
{M2} ⇔ M1 ‖ϕ M2 and that the existence of a separating formula for two
classes of models implies that they are disjoint.
We can gradually fill up the gap between distinguishing power and expressive
power, with a hierarchy of notions capturing the ability of languages to distin-
guish pairs of classes of models, where those classes have cardinality up to κ: L2
is at least as κ-distinguishing as L1(L1 4
κ
d L2) iff L2 can distinguish the same
classes of size up to κ as L1. Formally, L1 4
κ
d L2 ⇔
∀C1, C2 ⊆M of cardinality less than or equal to κ : C1 ‖L1 C2 ⇒ C1 ‖L2 C2.
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We say L2 is at least as class-distinguishing as L1(L1 4
C
d L2) if L2 can distinguish
the same classes up to arbitrary size as L1.
Now it is straightforward to see that κ-distinguishability coincides with stan-
dard distinguishability for κ = 1. Standard expressivity coincides with class-
distinguishability or |M|-distinguishability if M is not a proper class as Theo-
rem 1 shows:
Theorem 1 For logical languages L1, L2 that are interpretable on a class of
models M, the following are equivalent:
1. L2 is at least as class-distinguishing as L1 (L1 4
C
d L2).
2. L2 is at least as expressive as L1 (L1 4e L2).
The essence of the proof of Theorem 1 consists of the fact that a subclass
C of M is definable by L iff there exists a separating formula in L for C and
C =M\ C. (Cf. Appendix A.)
Since 4d is 4
κ
d for κ = 1, we have:
Corollary 2 L1 4e L2 implies L1 4d L2.
From the above results we know that expressive power can be approximated
by distinguishing power for increasing sizes of classes of models. However, the
hierarchy may collapse due to the presence in the logical languages of certain
connectives (which correspond to set-theoretic operations), as the following re-
sult shows:
Theorem 3 (Collapsing theorem) If L2 contains negation and κ-ary dis-
junction and conjunction, then L1 4d L2 iff L14
κ
dL2.
Proof. Right to left is obvious, we prove from left to right. Assume L1 4d L2, and
suppose C1, C2 ⊆ M are of cardinality ≤ κ, and C1 ‖L1 C2. Then, in particular,
for each M1 ∈ C1 and M2 ∈ C2: M1 ‖L1 M2. But because L1 4d L2, then also
M1 ‖L2 M2. For each pairM1 ∈ C1 andM2 ∈ C2, pick a formula ψ(M1,M2) ∈ L2
such that M1 ‖ψ(M1,M2) M2. Without loss of generality, because L2 contains
negation, we can take the ψ(M1,M2) such that they are true on the M1(∈ C1),
and false on the M2(∈ C2). But then for each M1 ∈ C1:
∧
M2∈C2
ψ(M1,M2) ∈ L2
separates {M1} and C2, and hence:
∨
M1∈C1
∧
M2∈C2
ψ(M1,M2) ∈ L2 separates
C1 and C2. So: C1 ‖L2 C2.
Hence: L1 4d L2 implies L14
κ
dL2. ⊓⊔
From the above theorem, it is straightforward to see that distinguishing power
and expressive power coincide if we restrict to finite model classes and a logic
with the usual connectives:
Corollary 4 If L2 contains ∨,∧ and ¬, then for each κ < ℵ0, L1 4d L2 ⇔
L14
κ
dL2 .
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2.2 Induced Equivalence Relation
In the previous subsection, we viewed distinguishing power and expressive power
in terms of the abilities of the languages to separate model classes. Now we take
a dual perspective, namely the equivalence induced by the limit of distinguishing
power over classes, since this will lead us to the notion of invariance.
Let ≡L be the induced equivalence relation of language L such that for all
M1,M2 ∈ M: M1 ≡L M2 iff M1 and M2 satisfy exactly the same set of L-
formulas. Note that M1 ‖L M2 iff M1 6≡L M2, so we can easily prove:
Theorem 5 L1 4d L2 iff ≡L2⊆≡L1 .
The theorem states: logical languages that induce a finer equivalence rela-
tion, have stronger distinguishing power and vice versa. We thus can compare
distinguishing power of two logics by comparing their induced equivalence rela-
tions. As we mentioned in the introduction, given a logic, we would like to find a
structural characterizations of its induced equivalence, as a structural measure of
its distinguishing power. We call an equivalence relation ∼ on a class of models
M an invariance for L on M if for all M1,M2 ∈M:
M1 ∼M2 ⇒M1 ≡L M2.
Various structural invariance relations for logics are known, like bisimula-
tion for modal logic and isomorphism for first-order logic. Sometimes we have a
precise structural characterization of the induced equivalence, e.g. two pointed
Kripke models are bisimilar iff they satisfy the same set of infinitary modal for-
mulas [1]. So bisimulation coincides with the induced equivalence relation for
ML∞. However, for many temporal logics including µ-calculus Lµ, bisimulation
is an invariance relation but not the induced equivalence relation: it is possible
to find two non-bisimilar models that can not be told apart by Lµ [2]. It fol-
lows that ML∞ is strictly more distinguishing than Lµ. On the other hand, Lµ
and ML∞ are not comparable in terms of expressive power since Lµ can define
well-foundedness while ML∞ can not, cf. [2].
We now investigate whether we can define a relation on models that similarly
corresponds to expressive power. A promising candidate is class equivalence:
Definition 6 Define the equivalence ≡CL induced by L on classes of models by
C1 ≡CL C2 ⇔ (∀ϕ ∈ L, C1  ϕ iff C2  ϕ), where C1, C2 ⊆ M and C  ϕ iff
∀M ∈ C,M  ϕ.
However, this natural notion of equivalence notion does not match class-
indistinguishability, as the following Proposition shows:
Proposition 7 For all classes of models C1, C2 ⊆M: C1 ‖L C2 ⇒ C1 6≡CL C2, but
the converse does not hold in general.
Proof. ⇒ is trivial.
To see that the converse does not hold, we may take some formula ψ ∈ L
that is contingent on M (i.e. ψ can be satisfiable but not valid on M). Now let
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C1 be the class of models defined by ψ, and let C2 be M. Then C1 ⊂ C2, so they
are not distinguishable (distinguishability implies disjointness). But obviously
C1 6≡
C
L C2, because C1  ψ but not C2  ψ. So, the right-to-left-implication does
not hold. ⊓⊔
The relation that corresponds to class-indistinguishability is the following:
Definition 8 For classes of models C1, C2 ⊆ M, we define the symmetric rela-
tion ≍L of L by:
C1 ≍L C2 ⇔ ∀ϕ ∈ L : (C1  ϕ⇒ C2 2 ¬ϕ) ∧ (C2  ϕ⇒ C1 2 ¬ϕ)
It is easy to see that C1 6≍L C2 ⇔ C1 ‖L C2 (but note that ≍L is not an
equivalence relation, as it does not satisfy transitivity in general).
Thus we have:
Theorem 9 L1 4e L2 ⇔≍L2⊆≍L1 .
3 Class Invariance
In this section, we propose two ways to lift the structural equivalence to class
similarity relations which can be used as candidates for the structural charac-
terization of ≡CL and ≍L. We show in Theorem 12 that they are indeed class
invariance relations if they are based on model invariance relations for the same
language L.
Definition 10 Given an equivalence relation ∼ on models, we can lift ∼ to a
relation on classes of models in the following two ways:
– C1∼
C
AC2 iff:
• for each M1 ∈ C1 there is M2 ∈ C2 such that M1 ∼M2.
• for each M2 ∈ C2 there is M1 ∈ C1 such that M1 ∼M2.
– C1∼CEC2 iff there are two models M1 ∈ C1 and M2 ∈ C2 such that M1 ∼M2.
It is easy to see that ∼CE and ∼
C
A are indeed generalizations of ∼: M ∼ N ⇔
{M}∼CE{N} ⇔ {M}∼
C
A{N}.
Remark 11 The above definitions give rise to some intuitive class comparison
games that naturally lift the model comparison game for ∼. For example, con-
sidering ∼CE, define G
∼
E(C1, C2) for classes C1, C2 of models as follows: Verifier
chooses two models M,N from C1 and C2 respectively. Then he plays the model
comparison game MC∼(M,N) with Spoiler, if MC∼(M,N) is defined. Verifier
wins iff he wins in MC∼(M,N). Depending on the type of MC∼(M,N) (e.g.
n-round, unbounded, infinitary) and the the results on MC∼(M,N) with respect
to certain language L, we may characterize ≍L′ with L′ being a fragment of L,
by the Verifier’s winning strategies of the game G∼E(C1, C2). (Space limitations
prevent us from elaborating further on the game perspective in this paper.)
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We can show that if ∼ is an invariance for L then the lifted relations ∼CA and
∼CE are invariance relations for the class equivalence or class indistinguishability
respectively.
Theorem 12 ∀M,N :M ∼ N ⇒M ≡L N implies:
1. ∀C1, C2 : C1∼CAC2 ⇒ C1 ≡
C
L C2
2. ∀C1, C2 : C1∼
C
EC2 ⇒ C1 ≍L C2
Proof. (1) is obvious, we only prove (2). If C1∼CEC2, then there are M ∈ C1, N ∈
C2 such thatM ∼ N . For any formula φ such that C1  φ, we knowM  φ. Since
M ∼ N implies M ≡L N , we have N  φ. Therefore C2 6⊆ {M |M 2 φ}. ⊓⊔
As we have seen in the examples, ∀M,N : M ∼ N ⇔ M ≡L N does
not imply ∀C1, C2 : C1∼CEC2 ⇔ C1 ≡
C
L C2 in general, otherwise there would be
no difference between distinguishing power and expressive power. Now let L∞∞
be a logical language with arbitrarily large (up to class-size) conjunctions and
disjunctions. We then have the following straightforward results:
Theorem 13 ∀M,N :M ∼ N ⇔M ≡L∞
∞
N implies:
1. ∀C1, C2 : C1∼CAC2 ⇔ C1 ≡
C
L∞
∞
C2
2. ∀C1, C2 : C1∼CEC2 ⇔ C1 ≍L∞∞ C2
Proof. We again only show (2), and due to Theorem 12 we only need to show
⇒. Suppose C1 ≍L∞
∞
C2. Towards contradiction, suppose there are no models
M ∈ C1, N ∈ C2 such that M ∼ N . Then since ∀M,N : M ∼ N ⇔ M ≡L N ,
we can find a differential formula ϕM,N in L
∞
∞ for each M ∈ C1 and N ∈ C2
such that M  ϕM,N but N 2 ϕM,N . Let ψ be
∨
M
∧
N ϕM,N then C1  ψ but
C2  ¬ψ, contradiction. ⊓⊔
We call a class of models C L-compact, if for any set of L-formulas Σ: every
finite subset of Σ is satisfiable in C implies that Σ itself is satisfiable in C.
For example, any class of finitely many mutually L-nonequivalent models is L-
compact.3 In the following we always assume that L contains binary conjunction
∧ with its normal semantics. We show that if we restrict to L-compact classes
then ∼CA and ∼
C
E match ≡
C
L and ≍L exactly, given that ∼ matches ≡L exactly.
To obtain this result, we use the following lemma:
Lemma 14 If ∀M,N ∈ M : M ∼ N ⇔ M ≡L N then for any L-compact
C ⊆M and N ∈M, (1) implies (2):
1. for all ϕ ∈ L : C  ϕ⇒ N  ϕ.
2. there is a model M ∈ C such that M ∼ N .
3 If not, there is an infinite set Σ of L-formulas such that each finite subset of Σ
is satisfiable, but Σ is not satisfiable as a whole. Then, for each equivalence class
[M ] of ≡L in C, pick a φ[M] ∈ Σ that does not hold on the models in [M ]. Let
∆ = {ϕ[M]|M ∈ C} ⊆ Σ, then ∆ is finite but not satisfiable on C. Contradiction.
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Proof. Suppose (1), and towards contradiction suppose there is no model in C
such that M ∼ N . Let Σ = {ϕ | N  ϕ}. Since ∀M,N ∈ M : M ∼ N ⇔
M ≡L N , Σ is not satisfiable in C, otherwise there is a model M ∈ C such that
M ∼ N . Since C is L-compact, there is a finite subset ∆ of Σ such that ∆ is not
satisfiable in C. Clearly, C ⊆ {M ∈ M|M 2
∧
∆}. From (1) we know N 2
∧
∆
contradictory to N  Σ. ⊓⊔
Theorem 15 Suppose ∀M,N ∈ M : M ∼ N ⇔ M ≡L N . For L-compact
classes C1 and C2 of M the following hold:
1. C1∼CAC2 ⇔ C1 ≡
C
L C2
2. C1∼CEC2 ⇔ C1 ≍L C2
Proof. We only show the direction ⇐ in (2). The proof of (1) is similar but
simpler.
Suppose C1 and C2 are L-compact and C1 ≍L C2. Now suppose towards
contradiction that C1 6∼
C
EC2. Then there are no models M ∈ C1 and N ∈ C2 such
that M ∼ N. We claim the following:
for each N ∈ C2 there is some ϕN ∈ L such that C1  ϕN and N 2 ϕN
Suppose not, then there would be a modelN ∈ C2 such that for all ϕ : C1  ϕN ⇒
N  ϕN . From Lemma 14 there is M ∈ C1 such that M ∼ N , contradictory to
the assumption.
Let Σ be the collection of such formulas: {ϕN | N ∈ C2}. Clearly, Σ is not
satisfiable in C2, but C1  Σ. Since C2 is L-compact, there is a finite subset ∆
of Σ which is not satisfiable in C2. It is easy to see that C2 ⊆ {M | M 2
∧
∆}.
However, C1 
∧
∆. Therefore C1 6≍L C2, contradiction. ⊓⊔
From the definition of L-compact classes, it is straightforward to see that:
Proposition 16 Suppose L contains negation. If for every class C ⊆ M there
is an L-compact class C′ such that C ≡CL C
′, then L is compact.
Proof. Given an arbitrary set of L-formulas Σ, if every finite subset of Σ is
satisfiable in C then every finite subset of Σ is satisfiable in the compact C′
(otherwise there would be a finite ∆ ⊆ Σ such that C 2 ¬
∧
∆ but C′  ¬
∧
∆,
which is a contradiction). Since C′ is compact, there is a modelM ∈ C′ such that
M  Σ. Thus L is compact. ⊓⊔
Proposition 17 If L is compact, then L only defines L-compact classes.
Proof. Suppose L is compact and defines the non-compact class C ⊆ M by
ϕ ∈ L. Let Σ be a witness to the non-L-compactness of C, i.e. every finite
subset of Σ is satisfiable on C, but not Σ itself. Note that every finite subset of
Σ′ = Σ ∪ {ϕ} is then satisfiable on C, and therefore on M. By compactness of
L, Σ′ is then satisfied by someM ∈M. But then M  Σ andM ∈ C by M  ϕ.
Contradiction. ⊓⊔
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Theorem 18 If L2 is a language extension of L1 (L1 ⊆ L2), then:
1. An L2-compact class is also L1-compact.
2. If L1 and L2 are compact and contain ¬ then they have the same distin-
guishing power iff they have the same expressive power.
3. If L1 and L2 have the same distinguishing power and contain ¬ then: L1 ≺e
L2 ⇔ L2 defines some non-L2-compact class which can not be defined by L1.
Proof. For (1): trivially by L1 ⊆ L2.
For (2),⇐ is obvious; we need to show⇒ . Suppose L1 and L2 have the same
distinguishing power. Then≡L1=≡L2 . Since L2 extends L1, we only need to show
L2 4e L1. From Proposition 17 and the fact that L1 and L2 are compact, we
know that L1 and L2 can only define L1- and L2-compact classes respectively.
We only need to show that if L2 can define an L2-compact class C, then L1
can also define it,i.e. for any L2-compact class C : C 6≍L2 C ⇒ C 6≍L1 C. Now
suppose for an L2-compact class C : C 6≍L2 C. Since L2 contains negation, from
Proposition 17 it is easy to see that C is also L2-compact. From statement (1),
C and C are also L1-compact. From Theorem 15, we know that it is not the case
that C(≡L2)
C
EC.
4 Since ≡L1=≡L2, it is not the case that C(≡L1)
C
EC. Again from
Theorem 15, C6≍L1C.
For (3), ⇐ is trivial. For ⇒, suppose towards contradiction that L1 ≺e L2,
but that for all classes C that are not L2-compact: if L2 can define C, then so
can L1. Because L1 ≺e L2, then there must be an L2-compact class C which is
definable by L2 but not definable by L1. From Proposition 17, C and C are both
L1- and L2-compact. However, according to Theorem 15, with similar technique
used in the proof of (2) we can show that C is then definable by L1, contradiction.
⊓⊔
Discussion Statements (2) and (3) of Theorem 18 are closely related to some
well-known results. Recent results on Lindstro¨m-type theorems for fragments L
of first-order logic are often formalized in the following form [13, 4, 11]:
A logic L′ that extends L has equal expressive power as L iff:
(a) L′ is compact and (b) L′-formulas are invariant for some ∼.
It follows from statement (2) that for compact logics, in order to obtain such
theorem from right to left, we only need to show that the extended logic L′
has the same distinguishing power as L, which in principle is weaker. This gives
an alternative perspective on the classical model theoretic arguments in [8, 6],
that use compactness for proving characterization results. Condition (b) helps
to limit the distinguishing power with the presence of (a) but with some hurdles
to overcome, cf. the discussions in [11].
Statement (3) gives us a hint on how to show that two equally distinguish-
ing logics have different expressive power. This task is often considered hard.
However, due to statement (3), we only need to concentrate on non-L-compact
4 cf. Def.10, replace ∼ by ≡L2 .
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classes. This could explain the complicated constructions in many works on ex-
pressivity of temporal logic. For example, in [3], it is shown that if a CTL∗
formula does not correspond to a CTL formula then it must have an infinite
number of mutually nonequivalent finite models. Now this is just a straightfor-
ward consequence of our general result.
4 Application: Class Bisimulation and Modal Logic
In this section, we focus on class bisimulation ↔CE , the lifted notion of bisimula-
tion ↔. We will demonstrate that such particular structural relations on classes
can be studied in a similar way as the equivalence relations on models. As we will
see in the following, most of the definitions and results about bisimulation and
modal logic can be adapted to the corresponding ones for class bisimulation. As
an example, we show a class bisimulation characterization of modal definability
similar to the previous result in [14].
4.1 Standard Bisimulation
We first recall some standard results of bisimulation and modal logic, which we
will use intensively in the next subsection. Let M and N be two Kripke models
with set of states S and T . A binary (symmetric) relation R ⊆ S × T is a
bisimulation relation if sRt implies:
1. V (s) = V (t)
2. if s→ s′ in M then there is a t′ such that t→ t′ in N and s′Rt′;
3. if t→ t′ in M then there is a s′ such that s→ s′ in N and t′Rs′.
For two pointed models M, s and N, t, we say M, s is bisimilar to N, t (M, s ↔
N, t) if there is a bisimulation R between M and N and (s, t) ∈ R. Note that
in this section we will only talk about pointed Kripke models. We may also call
them pointed models or simply models for short.
We call a pointed Kripke modelM, smodally-saturated or simply m-saturated
if for any state w ∈M and any set of ML formula Σ: if every finite subset of Σ
is satisfiable at the successors of w then Σ is satisfiable at some successor of w.
We say a class of models M for a logic L has the Hennessy-Milner property for
ML if for all models M, s,N, t ∈M:
M, s ≡ML N, t⇒M, s↔ N, t.
Here we list some standard results cf. [1]. First, bisimulation is an invariance
for ML:
Theorem 19 If pointed Kripke models M, s ↔ N, t then M, s ≡ML N, t.
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Let ue(M), pis be the pointed ultrafilter extension
5 of a model M, s, with the
principal ultrafilter pis generated by s as its designated point. We know that:
Theorem 20 For any pointed model M, s : M, s ≡ML ue(M), pis and ue(M), pis
is m-saturated.
The above Theorem implies the following bisimulation-somewhere-else result:
Theorem 21 For pointed models: M, s ≡ML N, t⇔ ue(M), pis ↔ ue(N), pit.
Let Cm be the class of m-saturated pointed Kripke models. Bisimulation coin-
cides with the induced equivalence relation of ML on Cm:
Theorem 22 Cm enjoys Hennessy-Milner property for ML. Thus for any M, s,
N, t ∈ Cm :M, s ↔ N, t⇔M, s ≡ML N, t.
The last standard result we want to mention here is that bisimulation coincides
with induced equivalence relation of ML∞ (ML with conjunction over any set):
Theorem 23 M, s ↔ N, t⇔M, s ≡ML∞ N, t
Moreover, we can actually show that the class of m-saturated models is the
biggest class which contains Cm and satisfies Hennessy-Milner property for ML.
Theorem 24 For any class of pointed models (generated by the designated points)
C ⊃ Cm, there exist models M, s,N, t ∈ C such that M, s ≡ML N, t but M, s 6↔
N, t.
Proof. The proof makes use of the next lemma, Lemma 25. See Appendix C. ⊓⊔
Lemma 25 If M, s ↔ N, t and N, t is m-saturated, then M, s is m-saturated
too.
Proof. See Appendix D. ⊓⊔
4.2 Class Bisimulation
In this section, we prove the analogies of the results in the previous section w.r.t
class bisimulation ↔CE . Corresponding results w.r.t ↔
C
A can be also proved with
little adaptation.
From Theorem 12 and Theorem 19, we know that ↔CE is the class invariance
for ML, namely for any classes of models C1 and C2:
C1↔
C
EC2 ⇒ C1 ≍ML C2.
However the converse is not true even when we restrict to m-saturated mod-
els. According to Theorem 15, such counterexample must involve non-compact
classes. For example, let C1 = {M1,M2, . . . } be the set of all the finite walks
while C2 = {M0} where M0 is a single point with self-loop.
5 An ultrafilter extension of a Kripke model M = 〈W,R, V 〉 is again a Kripke model
where the set of worlds is the set of ultrafilters over W ; two ultrafilters u and v
are linked by a relation iff X ∈ v implies the set of points which sees X through a
relation in M is in u. The valuation of proposition letter p at u is true iff V (p) ∈ u.
For the formal definition of ultrafilter extension cf. [1].
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Example 26 C1 6↔
C
EC2 but C1 ≍ML C2.
•

•

•

. . . •  
• •

•

. . .
• •

. . .
• . . .
C1 C2
Note that M0 is not bisimilar to any of the models in C1. However we can
show that C1 ≍L C2. Suppose not, then there is a formula ϕ ∈ L such that
C1  ¬ϕ and C2  ϕ. Since ϕ is satisfiable at the tree unraveling of M0, it must
be satisfiable at a finite submodel of it due to the finite depth property of ML.
However, any finite submodel of the unraveling of M0 is just a finite walk. Thus
there is a k such that Mk  ϕ. Therefore C1 2 ¬ϕ. Contradiction.
Like in the case of standard bisimulation, we want to identify the collections
of model classes where class bisimulation coincides with the class equivalence
relation of modal logic. Thus we need to lift the notion of m-saturated models.
Definition 27 (Modally-saturated class) A class C of pointed Kripke mod-
els is m-saturated if each model in C is m-saturated and C is ML-compact.
The following is a corollary of Theorem 22 and Theorem 15:
Theorem 28 If C1 and C2 are m-saturated then C1↔CEC2 ⇔ C1 ≍L C2..
The class-bisimulation-somewhere-else result corresponding to Theorem 21
requires the following generalization of ultrafilter extensions which aims to make
a class m-saturated.
Definition 29 (Ultrafilter extension of classes) Given a class C of pointed
models, let SC be the set of designated points of the models in C. We define
the ultrafilter extension of a class C(written ue(C)) as a new class of models as
follows:
ue(C) = {ue(
⊎
C), u | u ∈ UC}
where UC = {u | u ∈ ue(
⊎
C) and ∀X ∈ u : X ∩ SC 6= ∅}, and
⊎
C the disjoint
union of models in C (as unpointed models). Then ue({M, s}) = {ue(M), pis}.
Note that our purpose is to make a class m-saturated by a operation on class of
models, like ultrafilter extension does on single model. This means we need to
include many auxiliary models to make the class ML-compact. It is not hard to
see that the pointed models in ue(C) are defined differently than the Ultraunions
in [14], where ue(
⊎
C), u is called an ultraunion of C iff u ∈ U ′
C
= {u | u ∈
ue(
⊎
C) and u contains all the cofinite subsets of SC}. First of all, U ′C does not
contain principal ultrafilters generated by s ∈ SC . Moreover, when we restrict
ourselves to non-principal ultrafilters of
⊎
C, U ′
C
is still a subset of UC . To see
this we can prove:
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Proposition 30 If SC is infinite, U
′
C
⊆ UC|np where
UC |np = {u | u ∈ UC and u 6= pis for any s ∈ SC}.
Moreover if
⊎
C\SC is infinite, then U ′C ⊂ UC|np.
Proof. See Appendix B. ⊓⊔
Now we want to show an analogy of Theorem 21:
Theorem 31 (Class Bisimulation somewhere else) For all classes of pointed
Kripke models C1 and C2: C1 ≍ML C2 ⇔ ue(C1)↔CEue(C2).
To prove this theorem, we need Theorem 28 and the following two lemmas.
Lemma 32 For any class of pointed Kripke models C, any ϕ ∈ ML :
C  ϕ⇔ ue(C)  ϕ
Proof. ⇐: Note that for all s ∈ SC : ue(
⊎
C), pis ∈ ue(C) where pis is the principal
ultrafilter generated by s. Assume ue(C)  ϕ then for all s ∈ SC : ue(
⊎
C), pis  ϕ.
Thus from Theorem 20 and the preservation result for disjoint union, C  ϕ.
⇒: Suppose C  ϕ, then SC ⊆ VU C(ϕ) where V
U
C(ϕ) = {w |
⊎
C, w  ϕ}.
Now we need to show that for all u ∈ UC : ue(
⊎
C), u  ϕ. Since ue(
⊎
C) is the
ultrafilter extension of
⊎
C, it amounts to prove for every u ∈ UC :
VU C(ϕ) ∈ u
Suppose not, then VU C(ϕ) ∈ u, due to the fact that u is an ultrafilter. Since
SC ⊆ VU C(ϕ), V
U
C(ϕ)∩SC = ∅, in contradiction to the assumption that u ∈ UC .
⊓⊔
Lemma 33 For any class C of pointed Kripke models, ue(C) is m-saturated.
Proof. Since all the models in ue(C) are ultrafilter extensions thus m-saturated,
we only need to show that ue(C) is ML-compact. Given a class C of pointed
Kripke models, suppose every finite subset of Σ is satisfiable in ue(C). We claim
that:
every finite subset of Σ is satisfiable in {
⊎
C, s | s ∈ SC}
Suppose not, then there is a finite ∆ ⊆ Σ such that ∆ is not satisfiable in
{
⊎
C, s | s ∈ SC}. Thus for any s ∈ SC :
⊎
C, s  ¬
∧
∆. Therefore from the
preservation property of the disjoint union, for any pointed model M, s ∈ C :
M, s  ¬
∧
∆ and then C  ¬
∧
∆. From Lemma 32, ue(C)  ¬
∧
∆ contradictory
to the assumption that every finite subset of Σ is satisfiable in ue(C).
Now let
FC(Σ) = {V
′U
C
(∆) | ∆ is a finite subset of Σ}
where V ′U
C
= {s | s ∈ SC and
⊎
C, s  ∆}. It is not hard to see that FC(Σ) has
the finite intersection property since:
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1. for any finite subsets ∆ and ∆′ of Σ : V ′U
C
(∆) ∩ V ′U
C
(∆′) = V ′U
C
(∆ ∪∆′)
2. V ′U
C
(∆ ∪∆′) 6= ∅ according to the above claim.
From Ultrafilter Theorem cf. [1], FC(Σ) can be extended to an ultrafilter u
∗. Now
for any ϕ ∈ Σ, clearly VU C(ϕ) ∈ u
∗ since V ′U
C
(ϕ) ⊆ VU C(ϕ) and V
′U
C
(ϕ) ∈ u∗.
Thus from the construction of ultrafilter extension, ue(
⊎
C), u∗  ϕ. Therefore
ue(
⊎
C), u∗  Σ.
We now only need to prove that u∗ ∈ UC , namely for all X ∈ u∗ : X∩SC 6= ∅.
Suppose not, then there is an X such that X ∩SC = ∅. However, since FC(Σ) ⊆
SC , there is an Y ∈ u∗ : X ∩ Y = ∅. Then u∗ is not an ultrafilter, contradiction.
⊓⊔
The previous two lemmas complete the proof for Theorem 31.
As a corollary of Theorem 31 we can give a class-bisimulation characterization
of the modally-definable classes:
Corollary 34 A class of pointed model C is not definable in ML iff ue(C)↔CEue(C).
Proof. Follows from Theorem 31. Note that C is not definable by a single ML
formula iff C ≍ML C. ⊓⊔
It follows that:
Corollary 35 A class of pointed Kripke model C is definable in ML iff C and C
are closed under bisimulation and ue(namely ue(C) ⊆ C).
Proof. ⇒ is straightforward. We now prove⇐. Note that from Corollary 34, we
only need to show
C and C are closed under bisimulation and ue implies ue(C)6↔CEue(C)
Suppose ue(C)↔CEue(C), namely there are M, s ∈ ue(C) and N, t ∈ ue(C) such
that M, s↔ N, t. Now suppose C and C are closed under ue, then M, s ∈ C and
N, t ∈ C. Since M, s↔ N, t then C is not closed under bisimulation. ⊓⊔
We have to be careful if we want to obtain the analogy of Theorem 23.
A natural question to ask is whether we can get rid of class-size conjunction
and disjunctions in Theorem 13, but only use ML∞ that is the modal logic
with conjunctions over arbitrarily large sets. Unfortunately, we observe that the
following is not true:
C1 ≍ML∞ C2 ⇔ C1 ↔
E
C C2 (>)
Consider an example from [8] (where it is used to show that ML∞ can not
define well-foundedness). For each ordinal α, let Mα = {{β | β ≤ α}, R} be its
reverse, i.e. R = {(β, β′) | β′ < β ≤ α}. Let M ′α be the modification of Mα with
R replaced by R′ = R ∪ {(α, α)}. Now let C1 be the class of reserved ordinals
Mα and C2 be the class of modified reversed ordinals M
′
α. It is not hard to see
that none of the two models in these two classes are bisimilar to each other.
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However, from [8] we know that there is no ML∞ formula to separate C1 from
C2, namely C1 ≍ML∞ C2. Thus > does not hold.
As an analogy of Theorem 24 about Hennessy-Milner property, we can actu-
ally show that m-saturated classes constitute the core of the maximal collection
K of model classes which has the following property:
∀C1, C2 ∈ K : C1 ↔
E
C C2 ⇔ C1 ≍ML C2 (⊛)
Let Km be the collection of model classes which extend some m-saturated classes
by possibly adding modally-equivalent m-saturated models. Given a model class
C, let C|m be the class of m-saturated models in C. Formally,
Km = {C | C|m is m-saturated and ∀M ∈ C∃M
′ ∈ C|m :M ≡ML M
′}
We now prove the following theorem:
Theorem 36 Km is the largest collection of model classes that contains Km and
satisfies (⊛).
Proof. See Appendix E. ⊓⊔
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we studied the expressive power as class-distinguishing power in
depth. We lifted the notion of invariance to classes of models aiming to capture
the expressive power of logics. On compact classes, the lifted notions of class
invariance captures the expressive power precisely. In particular, we focused on
the notion of class bisimulation and demonstrated the application of our results
by revisiting modal-definability with our new insights which may shorten the
proof. It makes clear that compactness of classes of models plays an important
role in obtaining precise structural characterizations of expressive power. If two
logics satisfy the compactness property, their comparison in terms of distinguish-
ing power conincides with their comparison in terms of expressive power. This
helps to obtain characterization of compact logics in terms of Lindstro¨m-type
theorems. However, compactness fails on non-elementary extension of FOL (e.g.
modal µ-calculus) or fragments of FOL restricted on finite models. We may
look for different classes of models with different lifting method for such case to
characterize the expressive power.
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Appendix
A Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. (1⇒ 2) Suppose L2 is at least as class-distinguishing as L1, and let C
be a class of models definable by ϕ1 ∈ L1. Then C = {M ∈ M | M  ϕ1}
and its complement C = {M ∈ M | M 6 ϕ1}. Since ϕ1 separates C and its
complement, it follows from the assumption that there exists a separating
formula ϕ2 ∈ L2 for C and its complement. But then either C = {M ∈ M |
M  ϕ2} and C = {M ∈ M | M 2 ϕ2} or vice versa. In any case C is
definable in L2.
(2⇒ 1) Suppose L2 is at least as expressive as L1, and let C1, C2 be classes of
models in M. Suppose there exists a separating formula ϕ1 ∈ L1 for C1 and
C2 such that C1 ⊆ {M | M  ϕ1} and C2 ⊆ {M | M 2 ϕ1}. Since L2 is at
least as expressive, there is a formula ϕ2 in L2 such that
{M ∈M |M  ϕ1} = {M ∈M |M  ϕ2}.
But then obviously ϕ2 is a separating formula for C1 and C2 in L2.
⊓⊔
B Proof of Proposition 30
Proof. First note that for any u ∈ UC , if u is not a principal ultrafilter generated
by some s ∈ SC then it is not a principal ultrafilter. Suppose not, then u is
generated by a s′ 6∈ SC . Since {s′} ∩ SC = ∅, u 6∈ UC, contradiction. Now we
know that UC |np only contains non-principal ultrafilters. Since SC is infinite, for
any co-finite subset X of
⊎
C: X ∩ SC 6= ∅. Thus we have:
UC |np = {u | u contains all co-finite subsets of
⊎
C and ∀X ∈ u : X ∩ SC 6= ∅ }
Suppose u ∈ U ′
C
. According to the definition, u contains all cofinite subsets of
SC . Now we show u ∈ UC by checking whether all co-finite subsets of
⊎
C are in
u. Take a co-finite subset X of
⊎
C. It is not hard to see that X ∩SC is co-finite
in SC . Thus X ∩ SC ∈ u, then by closure property of ultrafilter u, X ∈ u.
If
⊎
C\SC is infinite, then it is easy to see that u∗ ∈ UC where
u∗ = {X | X is a co-finite subset of
⊎
C}
however, u∗ 6∈ U ′C since it does not contain any co-finite subset of SC . ⊓⊔
C Proof of Theorem 24
Proof. Suppose towards contradiction that there is a class of pointed Kripke
models C ⊃ Cm such that C enjoys Hennessy-Milner property. Then there is a
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pointed model (M, s generated by s) in C such thatM, s is not m-saturated. Now
we consider the ultrafilter extension of pointed model M : ue(M) (call the gener-
ated model N, t). From Theorem 20,M, s ≡ML N, t and N, t is m-saturated, thus
N, t ∈ C. Since C has Hennessy-Milner property, M, s ↔ N, t. From Lemma 25,
M, s is m-saturated, contradiction. ⊓⊔
D Proof of Lemma 25
Proof. Suppose M, s ↔ N, t and N, t is m-saturated. Towards contradiction
suppose that pointed model M, s is not m-saturated. Then there is a point s′
such that there is a set ofML formulasΣ for which each finite subset is satisfiable
at successors of s′, but Σ itself is not satisfiable at any successor of s′. Let t′ be
the bisimilar point of s′ in N . We claim
every finite subset of Σ is satisfiable at the successors of N, t′.
To prove the claim, observe that for any finite subset ∆ of Σ, ✸
∧
∆ is satisfiable
at s′. Since M, s′ ↔ N, t′ thus ✸
∧
∆ is satisfiable at t′, meaning that there is
a successor of t′ such that t′ satisfies ∆. Therefore, every finite subset of Σ is
satisfiable at the successors of t′.
Now based on the claim, and the fact that N, t is m-saturated, we have that
Σ is satisfiable at some successor r of t′. However, there can not be a bisimilar
successor of s′ in M to r in N , otherwise Σ is satisfiable in a successor of s′.
Thus M, s′ 6↔ N, t′, contradiction. ⊓⊔
E Proof of Theorem 36
Proof. Suppose towards contradiction that there is a class K′ ⊇ Km such that
(⊛) holds for ML. Then according to the definition of Km, there is a class C ∈ K′
such that either C|m is not m-saturated or there is a model M, s ∈ C that is not
equivalent to any m-saturated model in C.
For the first case, there is a set of formulas Σ such that it is not satisfiable
in C|m but each finite subset of Σ is. Now consider the ue(C). It is easy to see
that Σ is satisfiable in ue(C). Thus there is a m-saturated model M, s in ue(C)
such that M, s  Σ. We now take the class C′ = {M, s}, it is clear that C′ ∈ K′
since it is m-saturated. Then for any φ ∈ Σ, C 2 ¬φ since φ must be satisfiable
somewhere in C. Thus it is not hard to verify that C ≍ML C′. Now according to
our assumption that K′ has property (⊛) for ML, we know that there is a model
N, t in C which is bisimilar to M, s. However, then N, t  Σ, contradiction.
For the latter case, since M, s is not m-saturated and we know there is no
modally equivalent m-saturated model ofM, s in C, thus ue(M), pis 6∈ C. Now we
consider C and C′ = {ue(M), pis}. It is easy to see that C ≍ML C
′. However, there
is no model N, t in C such that N, t ↔ ue(M), pis, since otherwise according to
Lemma 25 and Theorem 20, N, t is m-saturated too and N, t ≡ML M, s. ⊓⊔
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